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Writing Literary Criticism Gerald L. Bruns 
Criticism as a Social Practice 
THE DRAMA OF CU RRE NT literary criticism lies in the 
attempt of many talented people to cross a threshold between two 
conceptions of what it is they are doing. On the one side there is the 
idea that criticism is an activity or process of the mind that operates 
upon the literary work as its designated object; on the other side is the 
idea of criticism as a social and cultural practice?something that goes 
on in the world or in history rather than in the mind or between a 
subject and object. The first idea is unmistakably Cartesian-Romantic 
in character; the second is not so easy to name because it is not so well 
understood, but it is clearly related to Wittgenstein's reflections on what 
it means to make sense of anything, when making sense is not an 
epistemological process but simply a matter of knowing how to do such 
a thing when the situation calls for it. Think of making sense as 
something customary rather than as something mental, and you will 
have an idea of what sort of threshold literary critics now seem prepared 
to cross. Perhaps not quite fully prepared: the wise man probes with his 
foot. 
Take Geoffrey Hartman, the most artful and scrupulous critic now 
writing.1 Geoffrey Hartman can be described as a Cartesian-Romantic 
who, however, knows that everything occurs in history, even those most 
prestigious events called "acts of the mind." In order to understand what 
goes on in anyone's mind, one must first understand what goes on in 
history. "History" here is not history as an object of knowledge but 
history as a horizon of life. It is not the history conceived and studied 
by professional historians but history in the sense of "history of philoso 
phy," which is not a history of ideas but a history of philosophical 
practices?ways of doing what is called "philosophy," such as knowing 
how to talk about Plato and Kant. To become a philosopher does not 
require the having of philosophical ideas; rather, what is required is the 
close and meticulous study of philosophical texts from the Pre-Socratic 
fragments to Jacques Derrida's Glas. To understand these texts (that is, 
to be able to talk about them in a way that makes sense to those who 
also read them) is to be a philosopher. Philosophy in this social sense 
is not 
something that goes on in the mind; it is something that goes on 
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in philosophical circles, and these circles are narrow or wide, open or 
closed, depending on any number of vagrant circumstances. Routinely 
in his writings Geoffrey Hartman will say that he is not a philosopher, 
but this means only that he knows the history of philosophy less well 
than he knows the history of poetry or the history of criticism, where 
the question'of what Hartman knows resolves itself into a question of 
what it is his custom to talk about. The greater part of his latest book, 
Saving the Text, is given over to a reading of Derrida's Glas, which means 
that Hartman knows how to read a philosophical text?knows, more 
over, how to read an abnormal philosophical text,2 which is something 
that many philosophers cannot do, or anyhow won't try to do, but which 
is exactly the sort of thing that any talented literary critic ought to be 
able to manage. Geoffrey Hartman is someone who knows how to 
practice philosophy when he wants to, or when the occasion requires. 
It is hard to think of philosophy (or, for that matter, literary criti 
cism) as a requisite of occasions, but it was roughly in this social and 
practical way that most eighteenth-century writers understood it. Phi 
losophy was taken to be ethical rather than mental. It was something 
one chose (or learned how) to do, not so as to do it all the time perhaps, 
but as occasions seemed to call for it, or as one's life would call for it. 
This is also the way the eighteenth century thought about the writing 
of poetry and the study of ancient texts. To be sure, these various things, 
to be made interesting, had to be done with wit and skill, but to be done 
at all they required study and learning, reading and practice?and 
appropriate circles for doing such things, since doing anything on your 
own was a 
species of enthusiasm. Across this state of affairs, however, 
the Cartesian analysis spread like a deep stain, and by the time Samuel 
Johnson was dead the notion of practice had yielded everything to the 
notion of operation. Satiric alarm notwithstanding, the whole classical 
array of humane practices got redefined as so many epistemological 
processes, each with its own characteristic power (reason, understanding, 
imagination), its own appointed objects of knowledge, consciousness, or 
vision, its own claims to meaning and truth, and perhaps most important 
its own 
specialized audience. Philosophy, poetry, and criticism were 
internalized and, therefore, professionalized. This meant that one could 
not, say, practice philosophy until one became a philosopher, which 
meant (and still means) becoming the product of a certain mental 
development. To become a poet (or a philologist) would be one of the 
things that would prevent you from writing normal philosophy. One 
became a critic, it was said, in despair of becoming anything else. 
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The first part of Geoffrey Hartman 's Criticism in the Wilderness is an 
attempt to understand the history of professional criticism from begin 
ning to end, that is, from Matthew Arnold, who inaugurated the modern 
notion of criticism with a famous 
epistemological distinction between 
criticism and creativity, to, well, Geoffrey Hartman, who wants to undo 
the distinction by thinking of criticism as a kind of writing rather than 
as a noncreative mental process. Hartman appears at the end of his own 
history of criticism as an invisible presence among masters and friends, 
among them Harold Bloom and Paul de Man. Hartman and his friends 
are sometimes said to be a school (The Yale School of Critics) and to 
have a program (Deconstruction), but they are only a circle, and, like 
all circles, they are circumscribed less by identifiable methods, positions, 
or doctrines than by a common practice, namely, the practice of criti 
cism, which, next to the keeping of ledgers and lists, is the oldest 
profession of letters. It is important to remember (in fact, it is the whole 
point) that something can be common to a group of people without 
being uniform among them. For Hartman, the chief lesson of the history 
of criticism is that there is no such thing as a uniform or essential way 
of practicing literary criticism. Hartman is opposed to any notion of 
"normal" criticism, where what counts as normal (namely, what gets 
taught in school, or what one must learn in order to become a critic) 
obtains as a criterion of what is allowable in the art. Literary criticism 
has not got an essence which the practice of it must express. It is rather 
a historically contingent and highly variable discipline of understand 
ing, where understanding means knowing what to say to someone rather 
than having a concept of something. The norms and methods of criti 
cism, its controversies and desires, its claims and its values, that which 
it studies and that which it 
neglects?in short, the diverse theoretical 
and accomplished ingredients that make up what it is?are in constant 
alteration, not toward any end, nor as if guided by a developing and 
intrinsic nature, but just in the sense that they belong to history and so 
are dependent on what people are doing at any one time. Literary 
criticism in this sense progresses not by making new discoveries about 
what it studies?not by formulating and refining everything that can 
be known about Literature?but by the changes that are always occur 
ring in its customary way of doing things. The history of criticism, in 
other words, is to be understood on the model of social change rather 
than, say, on the model of epistemological breakthrough. 
In 
speaking of what criticism does, Geoffrey Hartman does not quite 
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wish to say that the understanding of what is written is the same as the 
understanding of the way critics talk about it, and of what they say in 
consequence, but that is pretty much what he has in mind. After all, 
consider the likelihood of anyone understanding the work of William 
Blake without understanding the work of S. Foster Damon, Northrop 
Frye, David Erdman, and (for that matter) the whole circle of passionate 
Blakeans whose writings constitute the ongoing tradition of Blake studies. 
One should not imagine that this circle is closed, except obviously to 
those who have not taken the time and effort to learn what goes on inside 
it (namely, talk about William Blake), nor should one imagine that 
what goes on inside it is uniform or even very stable, because what 
counts as "normal" discourse about William Blake is contingent and 
relative exactly in the manner of any social practice. Everything in 
history is strange, familiar, and strange again by turns, depending on 
one's position in it; nothing, however, ever goes on outside it, or inde 
pendently of it, and this holds true particularly for the understanding 
of what is written, which is always mediated by culturally specific and 
socially coherent traditions of doing such a thing. 
The world of learning divides naturally into those who fear that 
history is going to pieces and those who fear it will stop. Geoffrey 
Hartman inclines toward the latter view, and so he does not simply want 
to remind us of the natural contingency of traditions of understanding, 
he wants to intensify this contingency; that is, he wants to hurry history 
on its way, taking an already unstable situation (literary criticism as it 
is currently practiced) and destabilizing it further by adopting an atti 
tude of suspicion (or, more accurately, of irony) toward the way criti 
cism gets practiced, but particularly toward the way people talk about 
criticism, which is a serious business because the way you talk about 
criticism will determine how you go on to practice it. Hartman 's irony 
is in subtle contrast to the darker views of his colleague, Paul de Man, 
who directs a relentless suspicion not only toward criticism and its 
traditions but toward writing as such, that is, toward the possibility of 
making sense and, therefore, toward the common assumption that such 
a thing as understanding can occur at all. For Paul de Man, writing and 
the understanding of what is written are essentially epistemological 
functions that cannot be shown to be productive in the way they are 
commonly thought to be. Hartman 's suspicion, however, never flowers 
into 
epistemological skepticism, because he thinks of understanding in 
terms of practice rather than process. Thus, for example, what skeptics 
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like de Man call 
"indeterminacy" (the inability to determine what 
anything means, or whether something is true) is for Hartman not a 
condition native to rationality but belongs rather to the artistry of those 
(writers and readers alike) who are less inclined than in a former time 
to 
regard the category of meaning as the governing category of human 
understanding. In one of the concluding sections of Criticism in the 
Wilderness ("Criticism, Indeterminacy, Irony"), Hartman speaks of in 
determinacy as something that one does rather than as something that 
one suffers: 
May I emphasize the following: As a guiding concept, inde 
terminacy does not merely delay the determination of mean 
ing, that is, suspend premature judgments and allow greater 
thoughtfulness. The delay is not heuristic alone, a device to 
slow the act of reading till we appreciate (I could think here 
of Stanley Fish) its complexity. The delay is intrinsic: from 
a certain point of view, it is thoughtfulness itself, Keats's 
"negative capability," a labor that aims not to overcome the 
negative or indeterminate but to stay within it as long as is 
necessary, (pp. 269-70) 
Indeterminacy as it is understood here is not (as it is for Paul de Man) 
an 
epistemological problem rooted in the figurai structure of a text; on 
the contrary, it is a hermeneutical attitude that one brings to what is 
written precisely to keep open (one might say, to keep "alive") one's 
understanding of it. Indeterminacy is not a technique or method of 
reading; it is an openness to the historicity of understanding, or an 
awareness that one's understanding of a text goes on in time, under 
conditions that one cannot always be conscious of, and within situations 
that are social, open-ended, and contingent?and always made possible 
by what has gone on before. What Hartman wants is a criticism rooted 
in this awareness. 
What is at issue here, of course, is the question of what it means to 
understand anything. Our conceptions of rationality incline us toward 
the view that there can be no understanding at all which has not been 
fixed in the form of an interpretation, that is, in the form of an explicit 
statement of understanding that one builds up from the situation in 
which 
understanding actually occurs. Interpretation is thus the explicit 
and formal determination of what is understood. Interpretation is how 
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we know that understanding has occurred, or has been attempted. What 
Hartman resists, however, is simply this rational desire to abstract under 
standing from its historicity or to fix understanding at a particular 
moment of its life. Hartman, one might say, is a natural adversary of 
explicitness, at least to the extent that making one's understanding 
explicit (that is, giving an interpretation of a text) requires the fixing 
of a position that will stand athwart the future and so close it off to new 
sources of understanding. However, I think Hartman 's fear of fixity is 
excessive. Interpretation need not be made into a Chinese Wall, because 
to understand a text is not to possess a fixed view of it in the sense of 
having a concept of what it means. Indeed, the text is not any sort of 
object about which one can be said to have concepts, or about which one 
can maintain fixed views, because it has, after all, a temporality all its 
own. As Heidegger says in "The Origin of the Work of Art," the work 
will always resist every effort on our part to grasp it as an object or to 
turn it into an idea. The temporality of the work is part of its powerful 
reserve, its ability to close itself up before every attempt on our part to 
break into it and subdue its contents. The work of art is always able to 
withstand epistemological conquest. Hartman's own interpretive reserve 
(his delight in indeterminacy) might be regarded as the critical counter 
part of this reserve of art, its monumental self-possession that always 
exceeds and prolongs indefinitely our understanding.3 This is why un 
derstanding can be more adequately characterized as belonging to tradi 
tions rather than to the minds of individual readers; and this is why 
literary criticism can be more adequately described as a social practice 
rather than as a mental act. 
The problem arises (it arises in Hartman 's case) when the critic 
realizes that in order to make himself understood he must make his 
understanding explicit; it arises, in other words, precisely when the 
critic confronts his own historicity or (much to the same point) his own 
social reality. The critic is always exposed, not only to a private situation 
of understanding (governed by the old Cartesian-Romantic relation of 
subject and object), but precisely to that social situation in which he is 
called upon to get up and say what it is that a text means (or what it 
is that we can say about it). The critic is always summoned to address 
the situation in which he finds himself?as Hartman likes to say, the 
critic is always "answerable" (in the classroom, to his colleagues) to 
what goes on in the history of criticism, and not the history of criticism 
only but the human life-world in which this history occurs. Interpreta 
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tion in this sense is explicit not because it is conceptually fixed but 
because it is profoundly social. It is required not so much in behalf of 
the texts that we study as in behalf of ourselves. Interpretation is the way 
we make sense to one another when we read. The characteristic relation 
in literary study is not between the critic and the work, or between 
reader and text, but between critic and critic, or between critic and 
world; that is, criticism is formed on the basis of subject-subject, not 
subject-object relationships. Interpretation in this view is just knowing 
what to say about what is written, and saying it in a way that will enable 
those who are disposed to understand you to say, in turn, just what it 
is that you mean. Here is where Hartman 's own inexplicitness?his own 
reserved or artful style of criticism?sometimes gets him into trouble 
with his fellow-critics, who complain that Hartman is not always easy 
to understand. 
Criticism as an Art of Writing 
This is a 
complicated issue, because for Hartman criticism is as much 
an authorial as a hermeneutical practice. For example, in Criticism in the 
Wilderness ("Literary Commentary as Literature"), he expresses a desire 
for a criticism that has overcome its hermeneutical task: 
What I am saying ... is that literary commentary may 
cross the line and become as demanding as literature: it is an 
unpredictable or unstable genre that cannot be subordinated, 
a priori, to its referential or commentating function. Com 
mentary certainly remains one of the defining features, for 
it is hardly useful to describe as "criticism" an essay that does 
not review in some way an existing book or other work. But 
the perspectival power of criticism, its strength of recontex 
tualization, must be such that the critical essay should not be 
considered a supplement to something else. Though the irony 
described by Lukacs [in "On the Nature and Form of the 
Essay," from which I will be quoting below] may formally 
subdue the essay to a given work, a reversal must be possible 
whereby this "secondary" piece of writing turns out to be 
"primary." (p. 201) 
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Hartman, in other words, wants criticism to be, not ancillary and, 
therefore, parasitic, but something originary and wirklich?and, there 
fore, worthy of study?in its own right. He wants to be able to claim 
for criticism, and specifically for the critical essay, the privilege of the 
work of art: he wants to characterize it formally as an "art genre" (p. 
191). 
And why shouldn't the critical essay be privileged as art? We can 
answer 
again that, since the Enlightenment, we have been taught to 
discuss distinctions among genres of writing as if they were rooted in 
epistemological distinctions, as if each genre corresponded to, and were 
made possible by, a specific and isolatable mental process (an act of 
imagination, for example, as against an act of reason). Art, to this way 
of thinking, is rooted in creativeness, or in the creativity of the mind, 
whereas the essay originates elsewhere in some ratiocinative or reflective 
operation upon what has already been created. In the essay "On the 
Nature and Form of the Essay," Luk?cs says that "the essay always 
speaks of something that has already been given form, or at least some 
thing that has already been there at some time in the past; hence it is 
part of the nature of the essay that it does not create new things from 
an 
empty nothingness but only orders those which were once alive."4 
This way of thinking, however, leaves only two possibilities for the art 
of the essay: (1) since the essay is not a creative art, it must be another 
sort of art, perhaps an art of language or of rhetoric on the ancient model 
of techn?; or (2) since the essay is not creative in the same sense that 
poetry is creative (that is, able to summon things ex nihilo, or out of the 
mind's "vast abyss"), it must be creative in some other way?creative, 
as in Matthew Arnold's conception, of new contexts or situations or 
potentialities for what we normally think of as art. Either way, however, 
the essay as art seems doomed: it can only claim to be art in some sense 
in which, in the end, it is not quite what it claims to be; that is, it is 
art 
only in a certain manner of speaking. It remains, for all that can be 
said about it, epistemologically determined as a merely hermeneutical 
"art." 
It is time, in behalf of the critical essay, to ask the right question: 
What counts as art, anyhow? The attempt to define art as a product of 
a certain kind of mental process will naturally lead us to accept as art 
only those kinds of production which are intelligible in terms of our 
descriptions of this process. The circularity here, which can be attacked 
or defended in various interesting ways, is not at issue. What needs to 
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be understood is that the Enlightenment privileging of epistemology 
which supports our talk about art is something that art itself frequently 
calls into question, as when William Carlos Williams says that "A poem 
can be made out of anything,"5 even newspaper clippings. Newspaper 
clippings do not, normally, count as art, but one does not need a theory 
of imagination to explain why this is the case; rather, one needs only 
to understand what goes on in the history of art, where, among other 
amazing events, newspaper clippings sometimes turn up in poems (as 
they do, for example, in Paterson). 
I cannot forbear repeating here the wonderful story that Williams 
tells (in Kora in Hell) about Duchamp: "One day Duchamp decided that 
his composition for that day would be the first thing that struck his eye 
in the first hardware store he should enter. It turned out to be a pickax 
which he bought and set up in his studio. That was his composition."6 
Notice that here the making of the work of art is not accountable in 
terms of an epistemological process. Indeed, from an epistemological 
point of view, Duchamp cannot be said to have produced a work of art 
at all, because, obviously, his mind has not worked to that effect. Noth 
ing has got "created," so that, whatever the pickax may be (namely, just 
a pickax), it cannot be a work of art. Yet that, of course, is just what 
Duchamp calls it by setting it up in his studio as his composition. The 
point, however, is that Duchamp is not simply (or without reason) 
setting up a pickax as a work of art; rather, he is tacitly reformulating 
the rules for answering the question, "What counts as art, anyhow?" 
What he presupposes by his audacity are rules that work deliberately 
and forcefully against an epistemologically-based aesthetics. It is not that 
Duchamp has found a new way of making art-objects; it is that he has 
called for a new way of talking about them, a way that does not 
presuppose a theory of creation and all the vast mental machinery that 
such a theory requires. Indeed, the theory of creation as a foundation 
of art is plainly overturned by Duchamp. The wonder is why we still 
cling to such a theory now that Duchamp's sort of audacity has become 
one of the distinctive features of modernism. For we should surely 
understand by now that a work of art is capable of coming into existence 
for reasons that have nothing to do with anything mental. Thus the 
status of the pickax as art is shown to be situational rather than epistemo 
logical, in the sense that its status is determined by how it is taken rather 
than by how it is made?and how it is taken depends in turn on the local 
and historical situation in which it makes its appearance. The pickax 
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as it makes its appearance in a hardware store will not normally be taken 
as art; the same object situated as a composition in the artist's studio asks 
to be taken aesthetically, whence it is up to us to judge whether we have 
reasons at our command for so taking it, or so figuring it. The pickax 
in any case makes a claim to the privileged seat of art, not by virtue of 
its production, but by virtue of its appearance in a situation that we 
recognize (for reasons that have more to do with history and tradition 
than with epistemology) as aesthetic. Of course, what we are able to 
recognize as art is more or less what Duchamp wants to test, and so 
perhaps it will be sufficient for us to speak knowingly of the irony 
embedded in the situation in which the pickax occurs where an art 
object was expected. But the lesson of this irony is that, in this situation, 
the nature of the thing in question is not at issue; what is at issue are 
precisely the reasons why anything is taken as art. 
On this point of aesthetic recognition there is, it seems to me, an 
obvious connection to be made between pickaxes and critical essays. 
What counts against critical essays as art is roughly what counts against 
pickaxes: namely, prevailing cultural norms, which in this instance are 
powerfully informed by epistemological notions of how art gets created. 
Nothing intrinsic to the critical essay prevents it from being taken as 
a work of art, just as, alas, nothing intrinsic to it will work in its behalf, 
because generic distinctions are determined socially and historically, 
pragmatically and provisionally, rather than logically and analytically. 
The critical essay on this view cannot be said to possess what Luk?cs 
called "a form which separates it, with the rigour of law, from all other 
art forms."7 No universally reigning distinction (possessing "the rigour 
of law") between one genre and another, or between art and non-art, 
can obtain. This I take to be exactly the lesson that we are to learn from 
Duchamp, Williams, and modern art generally. In other words, anything 
goes, such that newspaper clippings, pickaxes, and (let us say) critical 
essays can, depending on the situation, be counted as art. The point to 
understand is that we cannot tell that a thing is art simply by looking 
at it and describing what we see or analyzing what we find; we have 
to judge that it is art on the basis of reasons currently in force or (more 
important) enforceable through the strength of argument?reasons, in 
short, that will make sense to other people. It may turn out (as, indeed, 
it seems always to turn out) that people will steadfastly demand that we 
give epistemological reasons for our aesthetic judgments; or, much to 
the same effect, they will want us to say just how it is that we know that 
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a thing is art. If this is the situation (your basic Kantian or Cartesian 
Romantic situation), then, of course, it will not be easy to argue in 
behalf of the critical essay as art. The question then becomes: What is 
to be done about this situation? 
This question may help us to explain Hartman 's surprising decision 
to use Derrida's Glas as an example of commentary as literature, or of 
a critical text that overcomes its (normal) hermeneutical task and asks 
to be taken purely and simply as writing, "Part of the res itself, and not 
about it." Derrida is to philosophy as Williams is to poetry and Du 
champ is to painting and sculpture: he removes what he does from its 
assigned epistemological base and transfers it to the plane of "anything 
goes." Philosophy, Derrida says, can be made out of anything, even 
newspaper clippings, or, if nonesuch lie at hand, cuttings from texts by 
Hegel and Genet will do. That is, such cuttings (of which Glas is made) 
will serve to make the point that philosophy is textual, not epistemologi 
cal: it is not concerned with knowing but with writing, and it is, 
therefore, (now get this!) a profoundly conservative discipline notwith 
standing its occasionally violent reversals, because it exists only as and 
in virtue of the history of what it does.8 
What Derrida wishes to do is not so much to practice philosophy as 
to cure philosophical writing of its Hegelian desire for the absolu savoir, 
that is, the notion that the history of philosophy is motored by some 
transcendence that has gone in search of itself. Derrida breaks the 
millennialist hold on philosophy. Philosophy for Derrida is simply 
identical with its textual history (a history, by the way, which is not 
reducible to an official canon of philosophical "works": anything may 
find its way into this history, even texts by Genet). Philosophy is 
embedded in its texts, and it is this embedding that Derrida illustrates 
in Glas, in which his own writings lie between texts by Hegel and 
Genet, thus to produce, not a philosophical work on the model of, say, 
the Critique of Pure Reason, but just a text on the model of, say, the Glossa 
Ordinaria. Normally, of course, we think of philosophy on the Enlight 
enment or Cartesian model as a future-oriented program advanced by 
revolutionary turns: philosophy looks forward to that time (the end of 
time, or the end of its own history) when it will arrive at that which 
philosophers are born or made to desire, namely, a picture of reality so 
rigorous and complete, so systematically impregnable, that no further 
reflections or discoveries or new ways of thinking will be required to 
correct it. Philosophy will have at last become transcendent. Derrida, 
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however, turns philosophy around: his "revolution" turns out to be, 
literally, a conversion. He does not advance philosophy along its normal 
course but converts it away from its millennialist program and forces 
upon it (ruthlessly, madly) the textuality of its history. Philosophy has 
no future; it has only its texts, and it can be said to go forward (or to 
go on) only insofar as it does things to these texts?understands them, 
misreads them, breaks them apart, reassembles them, believes them to 
be true, reinscribes them (as by quotation, allusion, plagiary), and so on: 
various infinite ways, Hartman would say, of saving the text as a living 
force as against, for example, preserving it in a library (or a canon) 
where no harm will come to it and where, by this same stroke, it can 
do you no injury. In this respect Derrida can be said to have redesigned 
the history of philosophy so that it resembles literary history rather than 
the history of technology or the history of science. History on the 
Cartesian model is like the history of technology, which is a history of 
progressive obsolescence. It is this model that science has mapped out 
for itself, which is why the history of science is simply a form of 
unnatural natural history, or a history of things no one any longer 
believes or takes seriously, like the theory of ether or the notion of vital 
spirits. Science exists to protect us from its history, which is simply full 
of bizarre ideas. Literary history, however, is traditional rather than 
millenial or progressive. It is, as a matter of disciplinary principle, 
preoccupied with whatever has been written. Literary history is, for this 
reason, always a two-edged sword. It can be characterized in terms of 
what Gadamer calls 
"effective-history," in which what is written lays 
a claim upon us?calls upon us and, Gadamer believes, enables us to 
enter into the truth of things; or it can be characterized in terms of the 
oedipal struggle that Harold Bloom has discussed, where preoccupation 
with what has been written makes the attempt to write a bloody busi 
ness.9 Whichever way we regard it, however, what is written cannot 
adequately be taken as so many museum pieces to be admired from a 
distance, or in a disinteterested (or enlightened) spirit; what is written, 
insofar as we understand it at all, always impinges on us in diverse 
troubling and productive ways. 
The Theory of Force 
The notion of the breaking down of distance may help us to cope with 
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the fact that the basic unit of Derrida's writing is finally the insult, as 
when, in the typography of Glas, Hegel is made to couple with Genet. 
The metaphor of coupling is meant to be taken in an explicitly cruel 
and sexual way, and it is to be taken at our expense. Glas is Derrida's 
way of arranging for the buggery of Hegel (the position of Derrida's 
own 
writing in the text of Glas identifies him as the go-between). Many 
of Derrida's people think this is funny, but Derrida is not being funny, 
as Hartman is careful to observe (Saving the Text, pp. 22-23). The word 
"play" is commonly used to describe the abnormality of Derrida's texts 
(and of his philosophical enterprise generally), but Derrida plays to 
injure rather than, say, to liberate. Hartman compares Glas to Finnegans 
Wake in order to emphasize that Derrida's word-play is not meant to 
make us laugh; it is meant to cause pain. Joyce's word-play is comic; 
Derrida's is satiric, the more so because it is frequently aimed at some 
one, as in the case of Limited, Inc., in which Derrida insults the speech-act 
theorist, John Searle, by deliberately miswriting (among other things) 
Searle's name?an emphatic case of the breaking down of distance.10 As 
usual, Derrida's aggression is both insupportable and tendentious, since 
we know that misnaming (that is, catachresis, or abusio) is Derrida's 
characteristic figure of speech, a sort of signature. Catachresis, Derrida 
says (in "White Mythology"), is that which is hidden in all of our 
positive forms of address, whether in our statements about the world or 
in our talk among ourselves.11 We should not think of catachresis merely 
as a licensed solecism but as something licentious going on all the time 
in discourse?and, if you want to know the terrible truth, something 
that allows discourse to go on, enabling us to speak but only by never 
quite saying what we mean. Derrida has made himself the ungainly 
prophet or herald of misnaming. He knows that the most perfect form 
of catachresis (and also, on this analysis, the most plainly discursive form 
of discourse) occurs when, arbitrarily, you call someone a dirty name. 
It won't do to allegorize Derrida's insult, but to complete the thought 
that the insult deserves we should remember that calling people dirty 
names is something we are taught not to do?after, of course, we have 
learned how to do it as part of our learning how to speak. To learn a 
language is to master its defects, which are (Derrida believes) essential 
to its operation. Learning how to speak requires, among other things, 
learning how not to say what you mean, and also how not to mean what 
you say. The insult lodges among these lines of customary deceit and 
serves to tangle them. Outrage and tangling are the chief ways Derrida 
teaches his lesson. 
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Derrida is a hard man to deal with, which is why Hartman claims 
him in behalf of the art of writing. It is not easy for us to think of the 
insult as a form of art, but this, Hartman says, is only because our view 
of what counts as art is too enlightened, still too much in the power of 
doctrines that apply only to museum pieces: purity, autonomy, objectivi 
ty, aesthetic distance. Hartman wishes to disenlighten us by reintroduc 
ing the concept of force into our talk about art?and the uncertain 
hermeneutical task of commenting on Derrida's Glas provides him with 
just this chance, because Glas, though it lack the form a little, has the 
force of art. Saving the Text moves away from Glas toward a final series 
of musings and puzzlings that Hartman intends as a "counterstatement" 
to Derrida ("Words and Wounds, 
" 
pp. 118-57). Without actually match 
ing Hartman 's views point for point, I would like to elucidate his 
opinions with a short excursus on the ontological force of the word. I 
use the word 
"ontological" where Hartman would use the word "psy 
chic," but we are both speaking of the power of the word (and, by 
extension, the power of art) over the whole being of man, not simply 
over his feelings or his views, his perceptions or outlook. The power of 
words is a worldy rather than mental power or power over mental 
events. 
Go back again to Derrida's insult. The insult exists along the axis of 
discourse between the curse and the blessing, wounding and healing 
words. These are good forms to think about because they force us to 
speak of language in terms of what it does to people rather than in terms 
of what it says to them. Not much in our education prepares us to grasp 
this idea, but the ancients (Plato, for example, and every student of 
rhetoric before and after him?until, surely, the death of Alexander 
Pope) knew that the power of art is not simply the power of representa 
tion but a power of altering people for better or for worse, or as the 
occasion 
requires. Art is thaumaturgical, not epistemological.12 It is not 
remarkable for what it contains (images of the world, expressions of this 
or that idea or state of mind) but for the way that it works upon those 
who come in contact with it. Indeed, the contents of the word, its truths 
or falsehoods, become valuable for the very reason of its work. Every 
utterance possesses a magical component that gives it enormous power 
over those who hear it?power to cure or to poison, to transfigure or 
to derange, to quicken or to kill. No one has ever adequately described 
the nature of this power, but from the beginning its efficacy has been 
figured in terms of the voice, which is a pervasive and possessive rather 
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than an objective and determinable phenomenon. For example, in con 
trast to the letter, which always possesses the status of an object in a 
spatial and visual field, and which the eye is able to behold or take hold 
of from a safe distance as something external to itself, the voice is that 
which invades us, takes us over and occupies that most intimate and 
vulnerable portion of ourselves, so that we become hardly distinguish 
able from that which we hear.13 The letter is intrinsically rational, 
whereas the voice is demonic; the letter is intelligible, whereas the voice 
is 
maddening, since it is always a matter of possession by another. The 
letter can be grasped as an object, subjected to and by a knowing power, 
whereas the voice is always the master of whoever has ears to hear. This 
is no doubt why no one from the common rabble is ever allowed to speak 
in the presence of the king. It is no wonder that philosophy (king of 
the sciences) requires silence as the primary condition of its possibility; 
the 
silencing of alien voices allows thought to go on, and so becomes 
the first definition of reason and the criterion of sanity. Hence the 
enormous philosophical energy that has (for twenty-five hundred years) 
gone into the war against thaumaturgy for the soul of language. Where 
as rhetoric and poetry seek to exploit the power of words to torment and 
beatify, philosophy always argues that the purpose of language is simply 
(and only) the designation of objects?the rest, we have learned to say, 
is style. For the task of designation voices are not required, and, indeed, 
designation is a task that voices would only confound by getting caught 
up in one another's hearing. 
It has taken those who think this way about voice and language a long 
time to be persuaded that Derrida really wants to be the advocate of 
writing and textuality that he says he is. His desire to do injury?or, in 
Hartman's terms, his desire to wound and to cure?is nothing less than 
thaumaturgical. Yet it is true that he proposes writing and textuality, 
not as forms of expression and the coherence of discourse, but, on the 
contrary, as the displacement of these forms, whose purpose, he says, has 
been to hold in place the categories of voice and presence that define 
logocentrism, or the tradition of Western metaphysics, with its inexpun 
geable belief in a transcendental ground of being, reason, reference, 
knowledge, culture, and human destiny. Writing and textuality, Der 
rida says, take on philosophical interest in this tradition only as agents 
of subversion or d?mystification, since they repose in silence, ineloquence, 
materiality, and absence. Derrida makes his appearance to propose "the 
death of speech," and to inaugurate writing in turn, not as the written 
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form of 
anything?not as anything transitive or constructive?but just 
as that which is incompatible on every count with a metaphysics of 
presence.14 
But who could not make the argument that Derrida's conception of 
speech is already entirely philosophical, that is, already shaped by the 
standpoint of writing and its corresponding theories of language as a 
system of designation? Speech for Derrida is logocentric, but only be 
cause it is already taken to be the speech of predication, the speech of 
an "I" who speaks "of"?speech as propositional discourse, or the mak 
ing sense of things according to principles of identity and difference. A 
thaumaturgical conception of speech, by contrast, would emphasize the 
stubborn resistance of the voice to the logical forms of meaning (hence 
the natural incoherence of transcripts: speech as it actually occurs is 
unwritable). From a thaumaturgical point of view, writing as a cure of 
speech would appear to be nothing less than the casting out of gods or 
demons?not a disruption of designation but the securing of it by the 
breaking of a magic spell. Writing silences the voice and so robs the 
word of its power to heal or hurt. It is very hard to curse someone by 
means of writing; the written curse is a preservation of form without 
impact: it shows us what a curse is like so that we may examine it 
without peril. Writing, the thaumaturge would say, rationalizes lan 
guage, stabilizes it, puts it in order, makes it safe to use, and leaves 
nothing behind except the clean mechanisms of reference that logicians 
require for the analysis of statements like "The cat is on the mat." 
It would not be hard to show that Derrida understands this truth of 
the voice very well. Thus one can see why it is necessary to judge his 
valorization of writing against the voice as a palpable error. It is plainly 
not a blunder or mistake but what we would now call a deliberate 
miscreation: the only move Derrida could make so that we would not 
confuse him with Heidegger, who had already moved to cure philosoph 
ical writing of its Enlightenment passion for epistemology, objectivity, 
and systematic construction?but who had done so expressly by valoriz 
ing the voice over and against any philosophy of language that would 
reduce 
speech to the systematic manipulation of signs. "Implicitly or 
explicitly," Derrida says, "the valorization of spoken language is con 
stant and massive in Heidegger,"15 and this is true, but also, to speak 
strictly, it is not quite the case, because the later Heidegger goes beyond 
the language that you and I imagine ourselves to be using. The later 
Heidegger's reflections are concerned with what he calls Sage, Saying, 
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which has, however, nothing to do with predications or statements 
because it is not any sort of human activity; indeed, it is a notion that 
cannot be assimilated into any normal theory of language?cannot be 
grasped or explained in terms of any conception of language from 
Leibniz to Saussure?nor can it be arrived at by any normal way of 
thinking. The way to language is blocked by the way we are taught to 
think (that is, in terms of objects and relations). Language as Heidegger 
wants to think of it is not what we think of as language: it is not 
something that one can pick up and speak or write, although, of course, 
we do such things only because of language. We would do better to 
think of language as something that takes us over?takes possession of 
us and speaks itself through us?and, doing so, speaks what Heidegger 
calls "the language of being." This language is not a language of man; 
it is the language of disclosure and cannot be contained within any 
theory of reference or designation. In virtue of language as Saying or 
disclosure, what is hidden (namely, all that is) is brought out into the 
open, not in the sense that it is exposed to view and accessible as so many 
objects, but just in the sense that without Saying we would be worldless 
beings in the manner of stones: we would exist, but not in anything like 
a place to do so. 
"Saying," Heidegger says, "will not let itself be captured in any 
statement."16 We cannot say what Saying is, because it will not let itself 
be mastered by speaking or by anyone who speaks; on the contrary, the 
direction of power and mastery is altogether different from what we 
imagine it to be. Saying will not let itself be captured in speaking, 
because the one who speaks has already been appropriated by language, 
nor can he say anything at all except as he first listens to the Saying of 
language. The indispensable organ of discourse for Heidegger is not the 
eye, hand, or tongue; it is the ear: 
Speaking is known as the articulated vocalization of thought 
by means of the organs of speech. But speaking is at the same 
time also listening. It is the custom to put speaking and 
listening in opposition: one man speaks, the other listens. But 
listening accompanies and surrounds not only speaking such 
as takes place in conversation. The simultaneousness of speak 
ing and listening has a larger meaning. Speaking is of itself 
a listening. Speaking is a listening to the language which we 
speak. Thus, it is a listening not while but before we are 
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speaking. This listening to language also comes before all 
other kinds of listening that we know, in a most inconspicu 
ous manner. We do not merely speak the language?we speak 
by way of it. We can do so solely because we always have 
already listened to the language. What do we hear there? We 
hear language speaking.17 
We hear language speaking, and language speaks the language of being, 
or the language of disclosure. What is important to understand here, 
however, is the way Heidegger characterizes our relation to language: 
it is like a relation to a voice rather than to an object or a system. The 
one who speaks does not encounter language from the outside; rather, 
he is already in it, already surrounded and penetrated by it?it pervades 
him like a voice that disregards all boundaries between inside and 
outside, self and other, presence and absence. Our relation to language 
is like our relation to time, and also, in this same way, to being. 
Language is that to which we are helplessly exposed?and from which 
writing helps us to protect ourselves. 
Protect ourselves?but not from any sort of being. From what, then? 
To understand how Heidegger would answer this question, one would 
have to return to his account of the origin of language in An Introduction 
to Metaphysics (1953), where "man's departure into being" is described 
as a violent and terrible beginning.18 Geoffrey Hartman's answer, given 
in "Words and Wounds," concerns the fear of the word that once made 
the curse and the blessing such dramatic components of human life, and 
which endowed the name (or, more accurately, name-giving and name 
changing, and also name-abusing) with ontological force. From our 
enlightened point of view, of course, we can regard these things formal 
ly and simply as so many speech-acts or performatives, and we can 
dismiss their ontology as the old superstition of the word, but Hartman 's 
position is that our enlightenment has been achieved as much by repres 
sion as by progress?repression of the archaic fear of the power that 
words have over us, but also repression of a "lust of the ears" that only 
the aurality of language can satisfy (p. 123). Tacitly (but there is no 
mistaking the point) Hartman denies Derrida's assertion that our culture 
privileges voice over script, the spoken word over the written. On the 
contrary, the stronger argument is that since the Renaissance writing 
and print have produced a culture of the eye that has effectively banished 
the aurality of language from psychic life.19 There is no longer anything 
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to fear in language, nor anything to desire in it, because the word is only 
something that we read and write: it is always out there in front of us 
where we can keep an eye on it. We cannot imagine what there is to 
listen to, notwithstanding the effort (both fascinating and appalling) of 
a writer like Joyce, whose texts grow abnormal and unreadable in 
proportion as they are overtaken by the voice: 
Stand forth, Nayman of Noland (for no longer will I 
follow you obliquelike through the inspired form of the third 
person singular and the moods and hesitensies of the deponent 
but address myself to you, with the empirative of my vendet 
tative, provocative and out direct), stand forth, come boldly, 
jolly me, move me, zwilling though I am, to laughter in your 
true colours, ere you be back for ever till I have you your 
talkingto!20 
"Supposing," Hartman muses, "[that] the psyche demands to be cursed 
or blessed?that it cannot be satisfied, that it cannot even exist as a 
namable and conscious entity?as ego or self?except when defined by 
direct speech ofthat kind" (p. 131). 
In Criticism in the Wilderness Hartman spoke in behalf of indetermin 
acy as the hermeneutical attitude of being open to what is written? 
open, strictly speaking, to the historicity of what is written and to the 
historical life of our own understanding. In Saving the Text Hartman 
gives this theme of openness an additional turn. He proposes a rehabilita 
tion of the ear as an organ of discourse?an organ not only of speech 
and hearing but of writing and reading characterized by an openness to 
the force as well as to the meaning of the word. It is easy to trivialize 
this issue, but to avoid doing so one need only substitute the word 
"truth" for the word "force." There is always something more to what 
is written than simply what is expressed, but the laws of literacy and 
analysis tend to repress this "something more," whence expression is 
rarely taken as a form of direct address but is analyzed chiefly as an 
operation of the mind. The art of writing, as Hartman understands it, 
is that which seeks to restore to writing the power that we experience 
in situations of direct address, that is, when what is said or written speaks 
to us in such a way as to make a claim upon us. This means that the 
writing of criticism, if it is to be an art, can never be a self-effacing or 
voice-effacing act of composition, nor can it allow the one who reads 
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to stand outside of it as a bystander or eavesdropper. Like writing, 
Hartman says, reading requires 
a "conscious ear," that is, an openness 
to the affectional power of words (p. 143). "Reading is, or can be," he 
says, "an active kind of hearing. We really do 'look with ears' when we 
read a book of some complexity. A book has the capacity to put us on 
the defensive, or make us envious, or inflict some other narcissistic 
injury" (p. 128). Or, "To put it differently: critical reading is not only 
the reception (Rezeption) of a text, but also its conception (Empf?ngnis) 
through the ear" (pp. 141-42)?a sort of reinscription of what is written 
within the aurality of language. Doing this transports us out of the 
preserve of enlightenment, because it means the abandonment of disin 
terestedness and the analytic attitude, whence our relationship to what 
is written is like the relation to a voice rather than to an object, code, 
or system. This means that what is written is to be taken in as that which 
speaks to us, not as if across an aesthetic or analytic distance, but 
intimately as a possessive voice sounding us out and staking a claim in 
every nook and cranny of our being. Now we become implicated in 
what we understand. 
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